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WHEN A DEALER'S REAL ESTATE SALES MAY
QUALIFY FOR CAPITAL GAIN TREATMENT UNDER
SECTION 1221(1)
Counsel has a difficult problem when analyzing the tax law
applicable to the buying and selling of real estate. Those often
forced to litigate the eligibility for capital gain treatment include
corporations, partnerships and individuals, such as executives, doc-
tors or lawyers, involved in land development through the con-
struction of houses, subdivisions, apartment complexes or condom-
iniums for sale. Formerly, if the taxpayer was classified as a
"dealer," the real estate was defined as a non-capital asset and the
profit from its sale or exchange was taxed as ordinary income.
Only "non-dealers" could hold property eligible for the more ad-
vantageous capital gain treatment.' It has recently been recog-
nized, however, that a dealer might also acquire and hold property
which, under appropriate circumstances, could qualify for capital
gain. While dealers may now be eligible for capital gain, any
change in judicial reasoning must be viewed as a two-edged sword
in that nondealers may now be subject to ordinary income treat-
ment by reason of the scope and character of their activities. 2 The
purpose of this article is to analyze the shift in judicial reasoning,
to suggest practical rules for coping with the evidentiary burden
under the current state of the law, and to suggest techniques which
may be helpful at the planning stages.
I. INTRODUCTION
Congressional intent is the necessary initial touchstone for the
construction of any tax statute. The congressional purpose for
I. There are also two ways in which a loss may be deducted-as an ordinary or capital
loss: but this article assumes sales at a profit. For a general discussion of the topic under
analysis. see Simmons, The Realities of"Planning" for Capital Gains in Light of Dealer
Statu.%: New ('ase Law, Tools for Dealer's "Investment Property." 44 Los ANGELES B.
Boll. 15 (1968).
2. To provide a comparison, characterizing gain from the sale of securities, like real
estate. begins with § 122 1(1). While a "dealer" in real estate might be anyone who engages
in selling activity with some frequency, a "dealer" in securities is one whose activities fit
within a well established and fairly narrow definition. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1236
("Dealers in Securities"). The reason for the difference is found in the legislative intent of
§ 1221(1 )'s predecessor to prevent wealthy traders, buying and selling for their own account,
from litting within the exclusion and claiming large ordinary losses on stocks unloaded
during the Depression years. Libin, "Transactions Entered Into for Profit." ".Regular Trade
or Busiues." andl/or "Investnent": Some Distinctions and Differences, N.Y.U. 27th INST.
ON Fi:D. TAX. 1209, 1222-25 (1969).
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providing preferential capital gain treatment, in essence, was to
favor profits resulting from a gradual "appreciation in value ac-
crued over a substantial period of time,' 3 or, from a sudden in-
crease in value in the event of fortuitous circumstances, without the
taxpayer doing much to cause that increase.' On the other hand,
ordinary income was intended for profits "arising from the every-
day operation of a business, ' 5 or from a rapid increase in price as
a result of the taxpayer's performance of a production or market-
ing service. Since only the foregoing general congressional princi-
ples are available, the courts have been left to fashion their own
specific guidelines for applying the exception to the capital asset
definition contained in section 122 1(1). The result of the judicial
free rein is to be analyzed by this article.
A simple example would best explain the significance of the
difference between tax treatments. Assume that taxpayer's only
income during 1973 was salary of $40,000 and profit from the sale
of real estate, held for a number of years, of $70,000. Taxpayer is
married, filing jointly, has no dependents, and has exemptions and
itemized deductions from adjusted gross income totalling $10,000.
If the real estate profit is reportable as capital gain, the tax payable
would be $24,970.6 If reported as ordinary income, the tax would
be $45,180.1 The difference of $20,210 would most likely be the
subject matter of a dispute with the IRS.
Before analyzing the statutory tests, the discussion of capital
gain philosophy must begin with Corn Products Refining Co. v.
Commissioner.8 The taxpayer hedged against a rise in the cost of
3. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960). The "sub-
stantial period of time" idea was eroded by the shortening of the holding period necessary
for a long-term gain to six months.
4. Stanley H. Klarkowski, 1 65,328 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 2011 (1965).
5. Styra note 2. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955).
6. Salary of $40,000 plus $35,000 (gain of $70,000 less long term capital gain deduction
of $35,000). equals adjusted gross income of $75,000. After subtracting exemptions and
itcmi/ed deductions of $10,000, the taxable income of $65,000 produces a tax from the rate
schedule of $24,970. The minimum 10% tax on preference items is not applicable since the
$30,000 exclusion plus the regular tax payable is greater than the $35,000 preference
item-the long term capital gain deduction. The alternative tax is not used since it results
in a larger tax payable. If the sale occurred before December 31, 1972, and if the net long
term capital gain were more than $50,000, a different alternative computation would be
used.
7. Salary of $40,000 plus $70,000 equals adjusted gross income of $110,000. After sub-
tracting the exclusions and itemized deductions of $10,000, the taxable income of $100,000
produces a tax from the rate schedule of $45,180.
8. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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corn, the raw material for its manufacturing operations, by buying
and selling corn futures (i.e., contracts to purchase corn at a future
date for a fixed price) on the commodity market. The futures
dealings, if engaged in independently, would have yielded capital
gain. In rejecting capital gain in this case, the Supreme Court's
reasoning proceeded as follows: Corn futures do not come within
the literal language of the exclusions from the capital asset defini-
tion set out in what is now section 1221. Nevertheless, the underly-
ing purpose of the capital gain provisions is to exclude from ordi-
nary taxation only those "gains resulting from a conversion of
capital investments" and not those that are a "normal source of
business income."' Since the futures in this case were an integral
part of the taxpayer's manufacturing operations, ordinary income
treatment is required. The precedent thus set is that property which
would otherwise be defined as a capital asset will nevertheless
produce ordinary income if its sale is integrally related to the
everyday conduct of a business.'0
Corn Products has affected virtually every subsequent capital
gain case by the edict that "the definition of a capital asset must
be narrowly applied and its exclusions interpreted broadly."" On
a narrower plane, by establishing the integral-part-of-the-business
test, Corn Products formulated a principle which must be kept in
mind when reading any of the exclusions from the capital asset
definition. When certain items which are essential to, directly re-
lated to or at the core of a business are sold, any profit must
constitute ordinary income.
II. THE INTERPRETATIONAL
PROBLEMS WITH SECTION 1221(1)
Section 1221(1) of the 1954 Code, unaffected by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969, is a paragraph of the section captioned "Capital
Asset Defined," and provides in relevant part as follows:
[Tihe term 'capital asset' means property held by the taxpayer
(whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does
not include-
(1) . . . property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;' 2
9. Id. at 52.
10. Tucker. The Warren Court: Its Impact on the Capital vs. Ordinary Concept Under
ti htiternal Revenue Code. 17 KAN. L. REv. 53, 57-62 (1968).
II. 350 U.S. at 52.
12. INT. Ri-v. Coie o: 1954 § 1221(1). At the present time, the taxation of profits
1974]
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A narrow interpretation of the above exception indicates that a
given parcel of real estate is either a capital asset subject to prefer-
ential treatment upon sale, or a non-capital asset because a court
could conclude that any one of the following elements were pres-
ent: (a) the land was held "primarily for sale to customers," or (b)
the land was sold "in the ordinary course" of the taxpayer's busi-
ness, or (c) the taxpayer's activities constituted a "trade or busi-
ness."1:
Formerly, the courts emphasized the first element, the
primarily-for-sale language. 4 However, changing judicial attitudes
and the inherent difficulties in determining the intent of the tax-
payer for holding property caused confusing and apparently incon-
sistent decisions.' 5 A handful of recent cases may be read as shift-
ing the emphasis to the second and third elements. If the trend
continues, the reasoning of the courts should become more objec-
tive, consistent and predictable.
A. The Traditional Method of A nalysis
To aid its assertion of non-capital asset status and ordinary
income treatment under the primarily-for-sale language, the IRS
developed two techniques: the characterization of dealership and
a distorted definition of "primarily."
As in any search for subjective intent, circumstantial evidence
was relied upon to indicate the taxpayer's prime purpose for hold-
ing property. The most readily available circumstance was the
character of the taxpayer, as opposed to the character of the prop-
erty. The Treasury's basic theory was that a class of real estate
arising From the disposition or real estate is also governed by § 1231 (property used in the
trade or business and involuntary conversions), § 1237 (real property subdivided for
sale). § 1245 (depreciable property), § 1250 (depreciable realty). See also, the applicable
provisions of INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, subch. 0, and § 1201-1212. This article assumes
that the above sections are not usable and in issue. Note also that § 1221(l) especially
applies to taxpayers failing to qualify under § 1237.
13. The elements were broken down in a similar manner in the concurring opinion of
S. 0. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295, 302 (1966), the first case reviewed by the Tax Court after the
Supreme Court's decision in Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966), discussed subsequently,
which had a signilicant effect on the capital asset definition.
14. Bernstein, "Printarily for Sale": A Semantic Snare, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (1968).
15. For a thorough analysis of many of the decisions in the area, see, Freedman &
Solonman. Tay ('onsequences on the Sale of Real Property-A New Approach, 1967 S.
CAt i:. TAX INST. 281: Rubin, Capital Gain Treatment of Real Estate Sales: The lInplica-
tiofl of the Malat Case, 16 TuI.ANE TAX INST. 421 (1966); Katcher, What Is a Capital
,Iset. 12 W. Riis. L. REv. 256 (1961): Pennell, Capital Gains in Real Estate, 8 TUt.ANE
TAX INST. 23 (1959).
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developers, conveniently termed "dealers," were totally barred
from capital gain treatment. 16 Past and present activities concern-
ing similar properties were used to infer whether the taxpayer
intended to resell after a short time to realize a normal trading
profit, or to resell only after a long holding period to realize sub-
stantial appreciation in value.!7 The opportunity to assert dealer
status, and the probability that the assertion would be sustained,
gave the Revenue Agent an invaluable tool which usually led the
taxpayer to seek some compromise.
The problem was intensified by the meaning of the word "pri-
marily." The "ordinary, everyday" definition is "principally," or
"of first importance."'' 8 However, before 1966, the Commissioner,
the Tax Court, a number of District Courts and the Ninth Circuit
had adopted the view that a purpose is "primary" so long as it is
"substantial" or "essential"' 9 The IRS then argued that most tax-
payers held property for the dual purpose of investment or sale.
The obvious reason was that a person normally wishes to maximize
profits on investment property by keeping in mind the possibility
of resale if the expected appreciation either does or does not be-
come a reality .2 Since sale then becomes an essential purpose for
the holding, the taxpayer would be precluded from capital gain
treatment. Such reasoning made it almost impossible for anyone
bearing the stigma of dealership to achieve capital gain where he
in fact purchased and held choice real estate for long-term
appreciation .2
In analyzing whether property was held "primarily for sale,"
the courts developed a list of considerations most indicative of the
taxpayer's intentions: (I) Purposes for which the property was
acquired, held and sold; (2) Length of time the property was held;
16. See. e.g.. the black letter rule at J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, 3 FEDERAl. INCOMF,
G17 AN) ESTATE TAXATION § 43.05, at 4339 (1968 & 1973 Supp.); Weithom, Subdivisions
of Real Estate "Dealer" v. "Investor" Problems, II TAX L. REV. 157 (1956).
17. Simmons, supra note I.
18. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1966).
19. Compare Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1951);
American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604, 605 (2d Cir. 1963), with United States
v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1951); Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner,
341 F.2d 683, 688-89 (8th Cir. 1965). Cf. Recordak Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 460,
463-64 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
20. Bernstein. supra note 14 at 1098-1106.
21. On the courts' dilemma over the "investor" vs. "dealer" dichotomy, see Gault v.
Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1964): and Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital
Gains, 69 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1956).
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(3) Improvement and development activities; (4) Extent of efforts
to solicit buyers or actually dispose of the property; (5) Frequency,
number and continuity of purchases and sales; (6) Nature and
extent of the taxpayer's principal business; and (7) Extent and
substantiality of the transactions involved."2 Enumeration of the
factors in court opinions was inevitably accompanied by the state-
ment that no single factor controlled; they had a cumulative effect.
Nevertheless, the outcome of cases was usually justified by stress-
ing one or two items while apparently disregarding the applicabil-
ity of others. To complicate the matter further, courts appeared
prepared to consider a variety of other relevant factors. 2 The
cases were often described as being in hopeless conflict. For every
authority supporting a position there was at least one case contra.
Attempts to reconcile the cases and formulate a more specific rule
of law concluded, out of frustration, with the tired maxim that each
case turns on its own facts. 4
The controversy persisted and focused on the word "primar-
ily." It was believed that if the IRS's major premise could be
overturned the prospects for capital gain treatment would be more
favorable. Then in 1965 the Eighth Circuit struck a blow for lan-
22. E.g.. Libin, supra note 2 at 1212: J. MERTENS, 3B LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 22.138 (I)-(6) (1966); Maddux Constr. Co., 54 T.C. 1278, 1284 (1970); George
W. Mitchell, 47 T.C. 120, 126 (1966): Broughton v. Commissioner, 333 F.2d 492 (6th Cir.
1964): Gault v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1964): Raymond Bauschard, 31 T.C.
910 (1959). (/I'd 279 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1960); Kaltreider v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 833
(3d Cir. 1958): Smith v. Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); Friend v. Commissioner, 198
F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952).
23. Parsons, The Major Real Estate Tax Problems Faced by Builders and Contractors,
24 J. TAX. 262 (1966): E.g.. in Koch v. United States, 457 F.2d 230, 234-35 (7th Cir. 1972)
the court considered "whether the plaintiff replaced the property sold with additional and
continuing purchases of real estate," and thecourt placed weight on a prior judgment which
held that, ten years before those in issue, similar "property was not held primarily for the
%ale to customers in the ordinary course of business." "[Aibsence of motive to make a
greater prolit" was an element considered in Tibbals v. United States, 362 F.2d 266, 279
((t. (. 1966). The court considered the taxpayer's financial ability to hold on to the
property a, an investment and his preparation to do so in Maddux Constr. Co., 54 T.C.
1278 (1970).
24. "Because there is a good deal of overlapping between business and investment
property in this area, the cases are legion. 'Indeed, the case law has grown to a jungle-like
abundance accompanied by much of the welter and impenetrability which such fertility
produce,."' Gault v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94,95 (2d Cir. 1964), citing Kelly v. Commis-
sioner. 281 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1960). "Whether assets are held primarily for sale to
cuistomers in the ordinary course of a taxpayer's trade or business and, consequently, are
excluded from capital assets, is essentially a factual question to be determined from the
evidence in each particular case. . . .Extensive litigation on this question has developed
no single test of general applicability." Municipal Bond Corp., 41 T.C. 20, 29 (1963).
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guage purity by holding that the dictionary meaning of "primar-
ily," as being "of first importance" or "principally," was more
appropriate.2, In the same year a conflicting Ninth Circuit case
reaffirmed the Commissioner's revenue-increasing definition.26
Certiorari was granted, and Malat v. Riddel27 decided the winner
in the battle of semantics.
B. The Key to Capital Gain Treatment for Dealers
The Malat decision in 1966 was a landmark in the much liti-
gated capital gain area. The taxpayer had acquired a tract of land
with the intention of either developing it for apartment rentals or
selling the entire parcel in bulk, "depending upon which course
appeared to be. . . [more] profitable."28 The plans were frustrated
by difficulties in obtaining mortgage money and zoning and be-
cause of a rift that developed among the partners. The tract was
subsequently subdivided into lots to facilitate its liquidation. Both
the District Court9 and the Ninth Circuit 0 seized upon the evi-
dence of a dual-purpose holding, i.e., for investment and for sale.
Since one of the essential purposes for holding the property was
for sale, the taxpayer did not hold a capital asset, making his gain
ordinary.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower courts had
applied an incorrect legal standard. The per curiam opinion, while
analyzing neither the facts nor the problems of statutory interpre-
tation, stated:
The purpose of the statutory provision with which we deal is to
differentiate between the 'profits and losses arising from the
everyday operation of a business' on the one hand . . . and 'the
realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial
period of time' on the other. . . .A literal reading of the statute
is consistent with this legislative purpose. We hold that, as used
in § 1221(1), 'primarily' means 'of first importance' or 'princi-
pally.5
Unfortunately, the brief opinion lacked practical guidelines for
25. Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965), rev'g41 T.C.
20 (1963).
26. Malat v. Riddell, 347 F.2d 23 (1965).
27. 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
28. 347 F.2d at 24-26.
29. 13 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 1348 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
30. Stq)ra note 26.
31. 383 U.S. at 572.
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predicting the judicial reasoning which would be employed in fu-
ture cases involving inventory-like real estate. Except for giving
"primarily" its commonly accepted meaning, the decision did not
noticeably ease the interpretive confusion and has, indeed, caused
more problems.
Malat has been interpreted as requiring a parcel-by-parcel
analysis to determine if property is held "primarily" for sale.32
The courts began to recognize that the reason for holding might
vary with different parcels, and therefore intentions as to one par-
cel may no longer be inferred from the taxpayer's activities on
similar property.33 The test which came to be applied for capital
gain treatment appears to have been whether the ultimate sale was
of "principal" or "first importance" in motivating the taxpayer's
activities with respect to each parcel or each transaction reviewed
separately.
It is helpful to view Malat as extending the concept of the Corn
Products case to negate the I RS's characterization of dealer status.
Corn Products indicated that the relationship between the property
in question and the taxpayer's business operations was a factor to
be considered. The courts prior to Malat interpreted the business-
operations element for every taxpayer as being composed of his
total real estate activities, thereby putting "dealers" at a disadvan-
tage. The evolution in judicial thinking arrived at in Malat is that,
for some taxpayers, the business-operations element is restricted to
the activities with respect to the particular parcel and its sale that
is in issue. It now appears that the Malat concept is being further
clarified by the cases subsequently discussed in this article.
C. After Malat-Judicial Uncertainty
Tax attorneys had hoped that destruction of the IRS's key
premise would make capital gain treatment more readily available.
However, any advantage was slow in coming. It appears that con-
fusion revolved around the function of the list of seven considera-
tions indicative of the taxpayer's intentions (supra at section II, A).
In the pre-Malat era there was the need to look only at the activi-
32. Tucker, supra note 10 at 68; Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 184,
188 (8th Cir. 1967): Goodman v. United States, 390 F.2d 915, 920 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Neverthe-
less. evidence concerning sales and other activities of the taxpayer in years subsequent to
those in question is admissible when such information tends to establish a pattern that began
in the years in issue. Sapphire Lands, Inc., 1 73,023 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 91 (1973).
33. Altman, Does Malat Signal Trouble Aheadfor Real Estate Dealers Seeking Capital
Gain?. 26 .1. TAX. 118 (1967).
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ties of the taxpayer and to classify him as a dealer or non-dealer.
Malat's parcel-by-parcel, sale-by-sale search for a primary pur-
pose did not really comport with the traditional analysis. Follow-
ing precedent, the courts simply quoted the evidentiary factors,
cited Malat, then made the decision that the taxpayer either did
or did not "hold the property primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business. '34 The application of
"law" to the facts remained a matter of imprecise analysis. At-
tempts to formulate an on-going rule met with frustration. Judicial
reasoning based on considerations not a part of the basic seven
elements were viewed as additions to the list.35
Then, beginning around 1969, a group of cases shed some light
by suggesting a viable approach to the problem of reconciling the
cases dealing with eligibility for capital gain treatment for real
estate sales under section 1221(1). There appears to have been a
shift in the elements of section 1221(1) relied upon, as well as a
shift in the function of the list of evidentiary factors. The move is
away from the primarily-for-sale language, and from using the
factors to characterize the taxpayer's intentions while holding the
property. The trend is toward using the seven considerations to
characterize the taxpayer's method of selling the property as either
constituting a "trade or business," or being within the "ordinary
course" of business.
III. ARGUMENT FOR THE FURTHERANCE
OF A TREND
The tax planner seeks certainty in the law in the form of a
general rule to guide clients in avoiding expensive controversies.
When the same "law" is quoted in case after case, yet different
lines of reasoning are followed in applying the "law," then there
is an indication that the "law" is in need of restatement to bring it
more in tune with the ratio decidendi of the cases. The goal is to
demonstrate how recent Tax Court and Circuit Courts of Appeals
cases suggest a framework for a clearer and more precise analysis
which could put the difficult-to-reconcile cases to rest.
The cases appear to draw a distinction between two types of
34. For a discussion of the dilliculty in adjusting to the Malat opinion, see J. RABKIN
& M. JOHNSON, supra note 16 at § 43.05(10) at 4345b; and Tucker, supra note 10 at 69;
Hanson. When Will the Dealer in Real Evtate Receive Capital Gains?, 32 J. TAX. 40 (1970);
Outlaw. Gains on Sales of Real Estate, 46 TAXES 466 (1968).
35. See the cases discussed in Simmons & O'Hara, Three New Tests Appear for Ob-
taining Capital Gains on Real Estate Sales. 28 J. TAX. 218 (1968).
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fact situations, relying upon different elements of section 1221(1)
for each. One emphasizes the nature of the taxpayer's activities
with respect to the particular real estate. Capital gain treatment
would be available if the activities did not constitute a "business."
The other analysis emphasizes the relationship which the sale in
question had to the taxpayer's entire scheme of profit-motivated
business activities. Capital gain treatment would then be available
if the sale was not made in the "ordinary course" of the taxpayer's
business.
Since tax planning and evidentiary burdens would be different
depending upon which analysis applies to a particular client, the
task now is to ferret out the factual setting which appears to evoke
one train of reasoning as opposed to the other. 36 The determina-
tive elements should then be tied together to articulate a proposi-
tion or general rule of law. That is, where the court finds certain
factual elements present, a certain legal consequence should fol-
low. The court's reasoning as to whether the ultimate facts are
present serves as a guide for the conduct of future affairs of persons
similarly situated.
The approach of the subsequent discussion is first to set forth
a proposition synthasized from the particular category of cases,
and then to illustrate its application through the explanation of the
determinative elements of a number of recent cases in view of the
components of the general rule. The case analyses become succeed-
ingly condensed until the evidentiary facts can be succinctly enu-
merated parallel to the elements of the general rule.
A. Analysis of Whether the Taxpayer's Activities With Respect
to the Property Constituted a "Business"
The first category of cases concentrates on whether the mer-
chandising activities were of such extent as to be considered a
"trade or business" which had as its primary purpose the
customer-oriented holding of the property for sale. The taxpayer's
objective is to establish that he was merely nurturing the natural
appreciation in the value of an investment.
36. The ultimate question in this area remains purely factual. Municipal Bond Corp. v.
Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965); Bauschard v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 115
(6th Cir. 1960), and cases cited thereinThe IRS recognizes that this type of case is decided
entirely on its facts. The Courts of Appeals are bound, in the absence of clearly erroneous
findings, to accept the factual lindings of the trial court or tax court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a);
INT. Riev. Coin' oi, 1954 § 7482(a). Tucker, supra note 10 at 68-69. Therefore, this article
attempts to concentrate on distinguishing the cases on their facts.
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An adequate restatement or capsulization of the law which the
courts seem to apply is as follows:
Where 1) an individual's occupation does not depend upon real
estate sales, or, a corporation or partnership's main purpose is
the search for the best use and the ultimate sale of a particular
property, and
2) the taxpayer is able to sustain the burden of proving that
his activities with respect to the particular property sold, (a) to
enhance the value, (b) to attract customers, and (c) to effect the
sale, were minimal enough to raise the inference of the passive
holding of an investment,
then the taxpayer was not engaged in the "trade or business" of
selling the property, and capital gain treatment is appropriate.
The analysis, at first blush, appears to the traditional reasoning
leading to the decision of dealer or non-dealer status. However, a
closer inspection of the opinions causes a realization that the rea-
soning is quite a bit more subtle.
The case of Koch v. United States37 involved sales of raw
Florida land for residential purposes for which capital gain treat-
ment was allowed in five of the six years in question. The first
element was satisfied, thereby triggering the activities-constituting-
a-business analysis, by the fact that the taxpayer was a retired
person who lived far from the land.
Second element: The taxpayer made no improvements and
even voted against special assessments for improvements. Unsoli-
cited offers to purchase the raw land were forwarded to him in
Illinois after prospective purchasers looked up ownership in the
county records. Sales were made only when the offered price re-
flected substantial appreciation. Also, one third of the total profit
resulted from sales made under threat of condemnation. Thus, the
activities enhancing the value of the land or attracting customers
were minimal. However, the court reached opposite results as to
the legal effect of the frequency, continuity and number of sales
effected. The sales activity for five years, when considered in rela-
tion to his total holdings, did not constitute a "business" because
(I) on the average he sold less than one percent of his holdings per
year, (2) the average holding period of lots sold was between eight
and fourteen years, and (3) the average cost of a lot was $90 while
the average selling price was $1,650.
37. 457 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1972).
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The reasons given for the decision as to ordinary income for
the one year were
[T]he number of lots sold and the number of transactions were
much higher in 1959 than in the other years in question. The
profit was higher. . . [and] a seller's market existed during 1959
making extensive advertising unnecessary in that year. 31
The court allowed a relatively stable amount of transactions and
lots sold to be eligible for capital gain treatment. For the years
capital gain was allowed, between 7 and 55 lots were sold in 5 to
25 transactions; but for the other year there were 103 lots sold in
31 transactions.
Capital gain treatment was denied in Hansche v.
Commissioner9 for sales of lots upon which homes could be con-
structed. First element: The taxpayer was a partner in the Hansche
Produce Co. which, among other things, sold mink pelts. During
the years in question, one of the partnership purposes was the
subdivision and orderly development of farmland, the sale of lots,
and the subsequent regulation through use and construction re-
strictions. Since the lot sales were the largest source of partnership
income, it was considered the main business.
Second element: The development and promotional activities
were too extensive. The court found in the partnership agreement
"evidence of a well conceived and successful plan to develop this
land for sale to individual home owners" and "to sell the aforesaid
premises in parcels."' 0 A Board of Regulations, composed of the
partners, was established and insisted that proposed building plans
strictly comply with plat restrictions. The developed acreage in-
creased in value from $29,500 to $880,000, while surrounding land
increased only one-third as much. The value grew, not from passive
holding, but from the expenditure of $121,768 (approximately
$1,050 per acre) for tiling, surface draining, subdividing, water
supply, sewers, streets and other improvements. During the years
in question an average of eight lots were sold, while in prior years
a n average of on ly four lots were sold. The merchandising activities
of brokers were imputed to the taxpayer. The court described the
partnership's activities as a real estate business "engaged in
subdivision development" 4' requiring the profit from sales to be
38. Id. at 236.
39. 457 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1972).
40. lI. at 430.
41. Id. at 434. In William B. Howell, 57 T.C. 546 (1972), the taxpayer won capital gain
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treated as ordinary income.
In George W. Mitchel4 2 the profit on the sale of an old hospital
which had been purchased at an auction was permitted capital gain
treatment. First element: The taxpayer was an individual engaged
in mechanical and general contracting who participated in a joint
venture seeking the best income-producing use for the property.
The taxpayer had never before bought or sold real estate, other
than his home. Second element: The only expenditures were to
maintain the property and protect it against vandalism. Feasible
uses were thoroughly explored over several months, but the tax-
payer did not solicit the sale-he merely followed up on the numer-
ous inquiries received. The property was not listed with a broker,
not advertised, nor was there even a for-sale sign erected. Thus, his
activities were minimal.
The enumerated determinative facts of the next two cases
should be compared with the corresponding elements of the above-
mentioned proposition so that a basic grasp of this particular anal-
ysis can be obtained. In S. 0. Bynum4 3 the court reasoned that
since I) the individual, involved in the landscaping and nursery
business, subdivided his farm and sold lots in order to raise money
to pay off the mortgage, and since 2) (a) he spent over double the
cost and fair market value per acre on improvements, (b) he adver-
tised the lots for sale and listed them with realtors, and (c) regard-
less of the fact that he devoted only 5-10% of his time to selling,
the second business of selling subdivided lots became of principal
or first importance to the taxpayer, therefore, the real estate did
not fit within the definition of a section 1221(1) capital asset and
ordinary income treatment was appropriate.
The reasoning in Robert W. Pointer" was that since 1) the
treatment on unimproved land sold for use as an industrial park. First element: A corpora-
tion was organized solely to acquire, hold and sell the land. Second element: No steps were
taken to subdivide, improve or advertise. After the sale the corporation was inactive. The
rule of the case is that a corporation may hold a capital asset if such property is the
corporation's only asset even though it is held primarily for sale to customers. Id. at 552-
54. The reason given by the Tax Court is that the corporation's very limited activities were
insullicient to constitute a "business" of selling the particular parcel. The same reasoning
was applied to a partnership organized solely to sell one piece of property at a profit in
Robert E. Ronhovde, 67,243 P-H'Tax Ct. Mem. (1967).
42. 47 T.C. 120 (1966), acquiesced in 1967-1 CuOi. But.i. 2.
43. 46 T.C. 295 (1966).
44. 48 T.C. 906 (1967). al'd 419 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1969). Municipal Bond Corp. v.
Commissioner, 382 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1967), revg46 T.C. 219 (1966), which was on remand
from 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965), rev'g 41 T.C. 20 (1963). permitted capital gain treatment
on the sale of an industrial site."[Tlhe principal purpose of the corporation . . .[was] to
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owner of a manufacturing and construction business, who derived
additional income from patent royalties and sales of invention
ideas, subdivided, developed and sold about ten acres to a group
of builders, and since 2) (a) he spent $24,000 on improvements, and
exerted influence in the community to prevent the erection of a
structure which would obstruct the view from the lots, (b) the court
imputed advertising and other activities of builders, and (c) he
approved building plans, financed construction, and retained title
as security for the purchase price until a lot and house were sold
as a package to a third party, thus, the taxpayer's activities with
respect to the property were characterized as a "business," and
capital gain treatment was denied.
Recognition of this category of case analysis was received in the
1973 District Court opinion in Biedenharn Realty Co., Inc. v.
United States where the court stated
...holding primarily for sale . . . is by itself insufficient to
disqualify the taxpayer from capital gains privileges. The sales
must also be made in the ordinary course of taxpayer's trade or
business. The next issue, therefore, is whether the taxpayer's
activities constituted a trade or business.15
As a conclusion to this section it would be helpful to formulate
a definition of "business" as used in section 1221(1) and applied
to real estate sales when the activities-constituting-a-businesss
analysis is employed. The courts' strongest hints that a section
1221(1) "'business" is different from other uses of the word come
from peculiar comments such as, "the size of the business is insuffi-
cient to transfer a taxpayer's land activities into a business;'"" the
taxpayer's extensive "land holdings alone . . .[do not] constitute
business activity;"47 and that a corporation with no "business" for
section 1221(1) purposes nevertheless may be a "small business
hold [the propertyl until the price goes up and then [to] sell it at a profit." 41 T.C. at 20.
The taxpayer recogniied the property "as a bargain which would yield a good profit if held
for a substantial period of time." 382 F.2d at 189. Since the value increased from the
government's building of a road which gave access to the land, and since the "taxpayer's
efforts to advertise or offer the property for sale were minimal," Id., and since sale was
effected merely by the purchaser's execution of an option in the lease, therefore, the prop-
erty was a true "investment" as to which the taxpayer merely nurtured passively the natural
appreciation.
45. 356 F. Supp. 1331, 1335 (W.D. La. 1973). See also, Robert L. Adam, 60 T.C....,
1 60.107 11 -H Tax Ct. Rep. (1973).
46. Koch v. United States, 457 F.2d 230, 234 (1972).
47. Id.
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corporation" under section 1371.48 (Emphasis added) Over the
years the concept of a "busyness" developed. The idea was that the
selling of small items to many customers requiring constant efforts
indicated that the assets were probably of the type which Congress
intended to be subject to ordinary income taxation. To be consid-
ered a "business" for purposes of section 1221(1) it appears that
there must be continuous and frequent purchases and sales of the
type of property in question. One purchase and one sale do not
constitute a "business." There must be continuous, regularly con-
ducted activity geared toward attracting customers and effecting
sales.
B. Analysis of Whether the Particular Sale Was Outside the
"Ordinary Course of His Trade or Business"
This second category of cases concentrates on the relationship
of the sale to the taxpayer's entire scheme of real estate activities.
The basic issue is whether the sale was made within or without the
usual business operations. Again, the subsequent discussion first
sets forth a proposition constructed from this group of cases, and
then illustrates its application by means of a successively con-
densed enumeration, parallel to the elements of the general rule,
of the facts relied upon in reaching the decision in a number of
cases.
In order to begin the case analysis with a point of reference,
the following proposition is believed to be a restatement of the law
applied by the courts.
Where the taxpayer is able to sustain the burden of proving
1) that at the time of sale his main business activities involved
property other than that sold and in issue, and
2) the sale of the property in question was (a) incidental and not
integral to the main business, or (b) isolated from the normal
stream of regularly conducted activity,
then, regardless of the taxpayer's reasonable activities designed
to enhance the value, attract customers, or to sell the particular
property, sale was not in "the ordinary course of his trade or
business," and capital gain treatment is appropriate.
The analysis appears to begin with the assumption that the
taxpayer would have been classified as a dealer under the tradi-
tional judicial reasoning explained in section II, A, supra. The
48. William B. Howell, 57 T.C. 546, 556 (1972). Messamer, What Constitutes a Trade
or Business Lnder Federal Income Tax Laws, 3 KAN. L. REv. 99, 108-09 (1954).
1974]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
influence of Corn Products and Malat are more noticeable in this
category of cases to provide the justification for a real estate
dealer's eligibility for capital gain treatment.
Maddux Construction Co.49 involved undeveloped land the sale
of which as a shopping center location produced capital gain. First
element: The tract was purchased pursuant to the corporation's
main business of subdividing and developing residential real estate
and constructing houses thereon for sale.
Second element: One year after purchase it became apparent
that the character of the property was changing with the approach
of highways. The residential purpose was abandoned since a com-
mercial use of the location would be more profitable. Although the
corporate charter was broad enough to authorize nonresidential
dealings, the taxpayer's operations were not geared to attract cus-
tomers for commercial property. The taxpayer negotiated with
numerous prospective renters and purchasers, used brokers and
salesmen and distributed flyers to commercial prospects in efforts
to dispose of the property. Finally, the still undeveloped land was
sold in bulk, in the largest transaction ever participated in by the
taxpayer. The court concluded that the ultimate sale was an oc-
currence isolated from the corporation's purpose, and not within
the stream of regularly conducted business activity. Therefore,
capital gain treatment was justified.
A similar case was Commissioner v. Tri-State Corp.9 wherein
a corporation which ordinarily developed land and sold improved
lots and houses to individuals, purchased a tract with the intent of
selling it to the state only after it was suitably improved for a
shopping center site. However, before anything was done, the state
threatened condemnation proceedings to acquire the land for a
highway. The profit from such a forced sale of the still undeveloped
land was allowed capital gain treatment.
Contrast the above two cases with Royce W. Brown"' in which
49. 54 T.C. 1278 (1970). In Parker C. Folse, Jr., 73,097 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 438-
39 (1973). capital gain was permitted. The court found an intention to develop the property
into apartments, not to sell the land. Because of a disagreement between the two partici-
pants in the joint venture, petitioner chose.to sever his connections with the venture and
sold his interest to the other venturer.
50. 400 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1968), ql'g 48 T.C. 316 (1967).
51. 54 T.C. 1475 (1970), at'd 448 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1971). Two cases involving
,tanding timber illustrate how the classilication of the main business at the time of sale
could determine the relationship of the sales in question to the main business. In Huxford
v. United States, 441 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1971): Note, Capital Gains on Proceeds of Timber
Sah,. 33 LA. L. REv. 160 (1972), the sale of the right to use land for twenty years and to
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capital gain was denied. The individual was in the business of
purchasing developed lots, building houses thereon and then selling
the property to individuals. Deviating from normal operations, the
taxpayer purchased forty acres of unimproved farmland and then
sold his interest to a controlled corporation which he formed to do
development activities. The court stated that although the taxpayer
had never before acquired raw land for subdivision and develop-
ment purposes, it is clear that beginning in 1958 he expanded his
real estate business to include this closely related activity. The sale
was not isolated sufficiently from the original business.
United States v. Winthrop 2 points out that where the course-
of-business analysis is employed, eligibility for capital gain treat-
ment will not be affected by the taxpayer's activities to enhance the
value of the property, attract customers or effect the sale. The
court said that the taxpayer may subdivide land for advantageous
sale, and that reasonable expenditures and efforts to provide for
necessities, which the idea of selling a large tract of land in lots
,embraces, is permissible where the land could not have been sold
without the performance of such activities. Unfortunately for the
taxpayer, capital gain treatment was denied because the court rea-
soned that the individual, originally a civil engineer, had changed
his occupation to a real estate salesman, and the sales in question
were within the ordinary course of his reclassified occupation.
The concept of normalcy requires for its application a chronol-
ogy and a history to determine if the sales of lots to customers
were the usual or a departure from the norm. History and chro-
nology here combine to demonstrate that Winthrop did not sell
his lots as an abnormal or unexpected event. He began selling
shortly after he acquired the land; he never used the land for any
other purpose; and he continued this course of conduct over a
number of years. Thus, the sales were not only ordinary, they
were the sole object of Winthrop's business.5 3
remove and sell all full grown timber was held to be the sale of a non-capital asset which
produced ordinary income. Since the taxpayer's business was classified as tree farming,
harvesting and sale of the crop was the expected mode of operation and integral to such a
business. In Kirby Lumber Co. v. Phinney, 412 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1969), the liquidation of
standing hardwood was allowed capital gain treatment because the corporation had changed
its manufactu ring and selling business from pine and hardwood, to just pine products. The
hardwood sales were viewed as merely incidental to the development of the pine forest.
Quaere whether the outcomes would have been different if the court in Huxford had classi-
lied the activities as a sawmill operation, or if in Kirby the business were classified as the
sale oF lumber products.
52. 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969).
53. li. at 911.
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The following two cases demonstrate how a change in the pur-
pose for holding land could establish that the sale was outside the
normal stream of business activity. In Heller Trust v.
Commissioner" the taxpayer won capital gain treatment on the
sale of houses he had built. The court reasoned that the original
business of building and selling homes had been changed to the
rental of duplexes, and then, because of a weak rental market and
ill health, the taxpayer decided to dispose of all the duplexes. Such
a sale for liquidation purposes was not normal for a rental busi-
ness, therefore the property fell within the definition of a section
1221 (1) capital asset. The court disregarded the extensive advertis-
ing, the staff of salesmen and the amount spent for reconditioning
and redecorating the duplexes for sale. In effect the taxpayer's
contention was adopted that "anything may be done to further the
liquidation." 5 In Sapphire Lands, Inc. 6 the taxpayer lost because
the change in purpose was not sufficiently established. The corpo-
rations involved were in the business of selling real estate until
mortgagees and holders of promissory notes took over control. The
taxpayer argued that the main business at the time of sale was to
hold the land for appreciation and to sell only to pay the debts. But
the court found that the business was not sufficiently changed
because the charter was not amended, resolutions and statements
by the person in control reaffirmed the selling business, and sales
in subsequent years indicated that the transactions in issue were
merely the first in an overall plan for subdividing and selling the
corporations' land holdings.
The enumerated determinative facts of the next two cases
should be compared with the corresponding elements of the above-
mentioned proposition so that a basic grasp of this particular anal-
ysis may be obtained. The facts of Jerome S. Murray7 indicated
that (I) the business of the taxpayer was to participate in various
speculative ventures involving both residential and commercial
property sales. (2) The bakery business acquired was unusual in the
sense that it was originally held for a relative to manage until the
taxpayer decided the business was too complex. After repeated
efforts to find a use for the property, the building was demolished
54. 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967). Heller Trust also reaffirmed the position that if an
investment is liquidated, no degree of sales activity will justify ordinary income treatment.
Goldberg v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955).
55. 382 F.2d at 680.
56. 1 73.023 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1973). appeal pending, 5th Circuit.
57. 1 65,148 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1965), affd 370 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1967).
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and the premises sold to a purchaser interested in acquiring only
unimproved real estate. The sale was thus outside the ordinary
course of the taxpayer's normal business and capital gain treat-
ment was permissible.
Scheuber v. Commissione55 involved (1) a licensed and well-
established real estate broker who sold three and one-half city
blocks of unimproved real estate. (2) Because the taxpayer suffi-
ciently established that the land was held to provide his wife with
annuity income upon retirement, pursuant to a planned and regular
program of investment, and that after a nine year holding period
the sale was prompted by zoning changes and condemnation pro-
ceedings, and because the profit was unusually high, the court was
convinced that the property was not of the type in which he nor-
mally dealt. Therefore, capital gain treatment was permitted.
The taxpayer who would probably be subject to the ordinary-
course-of-business analysis has the task, first, of defining what his
main business was at the time of sale, and then establishing that
the sale was outside of the normal conduct of that business. The
search is for an unusual condition or event which would distinguish
the property in question.
IV. THE PLANNING STAGE
Most clients rely on a purely intuitive judgment as to whether
a given property should be purchased, or more important, should
be sold, and then look to the tax practitioner for assurance that
the profit will receive the preferential long-term capital gain treat-
ment. For the rare situation in which advice is sought beforehand,
the transactions may be structured to enhance the likelihood of the
property's fitting the section 1221(1) capital asset definition,
thereby making the sale eligible for capital gain treatment under
the rules synthasized from the preceding cases. 9 Keep in mind that
58. 371 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1967): Note, Large Profit is a Factor In Determining
Whether to Allow Capital Gain Treatment on Sale of Property By Real Estate Dealer, 5
HOUSTON L. REV. 150 (1967). In Clinton E. Gates, 52 T.C. 898 (1969), the court's reasoning
proceeded as follows: since (I) the taxpayer, whose main business was selling materials and
supplies to builders of homes, sold most of the lots which he had subdivided and improved
to builders, and since (2) the policy was to tie the sale of a lot to the sale of materials and
supplies. the legal effect was that the taxpayer held the lots primarily for sale to his builder-
customers in the ordinary course of his lumber business, therefore ordinary income treat-
ment was appropriate.
59. For a discussion or the planning problems, see Beck, The Situation of the Investor-
Dealer, N.Y.U. 26th INST. ON FED. TAX. 261 (1968): WEIss, HOW TO MAXIMIZE TAX
SAVINGS IN BUYING, OPERATING AND SELLING REAL PROPERTY, (1971).
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the trend in judicial reasoning, while making it somewhat easier for
"dealers" of obtain capital gain rates, is a two-edged sword in that
"non-dealers" may now be more susceptible to ordinary income
treatment.
At the first conference the client should be classified by com-
paring his situation to the factual distinction which seems to trigger
the different analyses. To avoid the confusion which could be en-
gendered by the use of the term "dealer," the two categories are
described, for convenience, as casual investor and real estate
specialist.
The casual investor is one who considers real estate as a sideline
because his usual source of income is from an occupation or profes-
sion. In general, advice should concentrate on either minimizing
the taxpayer's activities, or insulating the development, promotion
and sales functions from being imputed to the client. But if the
activities already were substantial, the sale should be distinguished
as resulting from some unusual condition or event which prompted
the liquidation of the investment.
On the other hand, the specialist is one devoting full time to
an entrepreneural activity in which real property acquisitions and
dispositions are integral to or at the core of a recognizable business
operation. Advice should be geared toward separating the property
from the type usually dealt with, or toward establishing that the
reason for selling was due to a change in circumstances.
The next step for the tax planner will depend upon when the
advice is sought-before or after the purchase.
A. Where Counsel is Sought Prior to Acquisition of Real Estate
Before purchasing property, both classes should be advised
concerning the use of a corporation. The specialist's information
should also concern the best methods for segregating and treating
the property as an investment.
1. The Use of Corporate Entities
An individual taxpayer, as a stockholder, officer or director, is
legally separate from his corporation, and the real estate activities
of one generally will not be imputed to the other.6 0 The principal
exception is where a controlled corporation is not sufficiently au-
60. Unless the collapsible corporation rule of INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954 § 341 applies.
See § 341(e) where stock ownership by a dealer taints the corporation (if the corporation
makes the sale) and all of the other stockholders (if they sell their stock).
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tonomous because it is used as an agent, co-participant, or joint
venturer to implement or further the taxpayer's personal busi-
ness.'" Therefore, the corporation's viability must be planned with
painful recognition of the statutory formalities of directors, min-
utes, meetings, and so forth to enable the corporate veil to
withstand the inevitable attack by the IRS.
The casual investor who foresees profitable sales to ultimate
users only if property is sufficiently developed would probably be
well advised to (1) purchase the land, (2) organize a corporation,
(3) sell the property to the corporation, and (4) then have the
corporation proceed to develop and market the property. Capital
gain hopefully would be realized on the profit from the sale to his
corporation, and the problems of Hansche, Bynum and Pointer,
supra, would then be obviated since the activities would not be
considered the individual taxpayer's business.12 Control over the
corporation would assure that, if the taxpayer's expectations are
fulfilled, the increased property values will eventually end up in his
pocket in one form or another.
The real estate specialist's advice would involve the organiza-
tion of a separate Subchapter S corporation to purchase, hold and
sell the particular property.13 If the activities with respect to the
property are minimal, the corporation would be classified as a
casual investor, the sale-would be eligible for capital gain treat-
ment, and the tax advantages would "pass through" to the individ-
ual. The specialist could thereby utilize his real estate expertise
without jeopardizing the status of the property as a section 1221
capital asset. William B. Howell64 illustrates the procedure. Two
real estate agents and a builder formed Hectare, Inc. solely for the
purpose of purchasing and eventually selling a tract of land for use
as an industrial park. The Tax Court found that the corporation's
61. George W. Mitchell, 47 T.C. 120, 127 (1966); Broughton v. Commissioner, 333 F.2d
492 (6th Cir. 1964). Bauschard v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1960). Spandorf,
(apital Gai Opportunis foi r Sponsors of Co-ops and Condominiums. N.Y.U. 31st INST.
ON FNi). TAX. 1855 (1973).
62. See generally. Robert A. Boyer, 58 T.C. 316 (1972); Royce W. Brown, 54 T.C. 1475
(1970): Tibbals v. United States. 362 F.2d 266 (Ct. Cl. 1966). Robert E. Ronhovde, 67,243
P-H Tax Ct. Mei. (1967) (promotion of a corporation as a customer for property held by
a partnership). Rubin, supra note 15 at 434-42. Depending upon the tax situation of the
parties involved, it may be more advantageous to organize the corporation and then to have
the corporation purchase the property from the third party seller.
63. But see, INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954 § 1378 imposing corporate capital gain tax on
a Subchapter S corporation, in some cases, where the election was made in the year of the
sale.
64. 57 T.C. 546 (1972); supra note 41.
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almost negligable activities were insufficient to constitute a "busi-
ness" of selling. The IRS then argued that since Subchapter S
treatment is dependent upon falling within the definition of a
"small business corporation," 5 and since it was decided that the
corporation's activities did not constitute a business, Subchapter
S treatment should be denied. Nevertheless, the Tax Court permit-
ted the individuals the pass through of capital gain by relying upon
different interpretations of the word "business" as used in the two
sections. For section 1221(l), a "business" connotes a continuous,
regularly conducted activity with respect to a property." For sec-
tion 1371, a "business" is a corporation with the aim of making
money.67 Since Hectare, Inc. was attempting to make a profit, it
thereby qualified as a Subchapter S "small business corporation."
2. Segregation and Treatment of the Property
as an Investment
Advice for a real estate specialist must recognize that he will
probably be subject to the ordinary-course-of-business analysis. So
his burden, unlike the causal investor's, is to distinguish property
purportedly held for investment purposes from other realty which
admittedly is the regular source of his business income. If a given
parcel is in fact an investment, it should be treated as such for all
purposes. The acts of the taxpayer should accordingly provide an
evidential basis raising the inference of separateness or
uniqueness.6 1
When planning the purchase of investment property, the tax-
payer should search for and document the characteristics which,
when considered in relation to the type of property usually han-
dled, have influenced courts in separating property.69 A considera-
65. INT. Riv. Coit OF 1954 § 1371.
66. 57 T.C. at 554.
67. Id. at 556.
68. Outlaw, suipra note 34 at 468-69.
69. E.g., Sapphire Lands, Inc., 73,023 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1973) (resolutions in
corporate minutes); Hansche v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1972) (statements
in a partnership agreement); Royce v. Brown, 54 T.C. 1475 (1970) (configuration, loca-
tion, zoning, proposed use, stage of development); Maddux Constr. Co., 54 T.C. 1278
(1970) (size); United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969), and Sapphire
Lands, Inc., 1 73,023 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1973) (lack of a pre-planned program for sub-
dividing and selling); Scheuber v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1967) (purchase
pursuant to a regular program of investment to provide ventual retirenent income); Jerome
S. Murray, 1 65,148 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1965) (hope that a son or son-in-law would like
to manage a bakery business); Carl E. Metz, 9 55,303 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1955) (the
alleged investment property was of better-than-average construction); and Parsons, supra
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tion which has set apart sales is the magnitude of the profit derived,
both absolutely, 7 and in relation to the taxpayer's total income .7
By extending the rationale to apply to the planning stage, the
attorney should sufficiently document the facts, studies and
hunches relied upon by the taxpayer to form a belief that holding
the property for a time will result in a large profit. Such evidence
will provide a basis for an argument that the taxpayer should not
be penalized merely because he did not realize all the profit he had
hoped on his "investment. ' 7 2
The tax planner should suggest that record title be obtained and
maintained separate from other real properties. An accounting
system should be established and appropriate entries made which
distinguish the "investment" property from inventory-like hold-
ings. Expenditures should be capitalized rather than deducted as
expenses. In general, all acts which would enhance the value of the
property in the long run should be separated from those activities
which might be considered his "trade or business."
B. Where Counsel is Sought Prior to Sale of the Property
The strategy for structuring a sales transaction to qualify for
capital gain treatment depends again upon the taxpayer's classifi-
cation. The casual investor must either minimize his activities, or
insulate himself from them. If activities already constitute a "busi-
ness," he should establish that the sale was prompted by a condi-
tion or event unusual to the "business." A specialist's only
possibility is to establish that the sale was a deviation from the
ordinary course of business.
As seen in the Hansehe, Huxford and Kirby cases, supra,73 the
definition of the type of business or occupation the taxpayer will
be engaged in at the time of sale could determine which analysis
is to be used as well as whether a sale was outside the "ordinary
course" of the business so defined. A stipulation in doubtful areas
could work to the disadvantage of the taxpayer, such as in United
States v. Winthrop74 where the taxpayer stipulated that "Winthrop
note 23 at 262 (a long-term mortgage loan with substantial prepayment penalties may refute
an argument that property was acquired for sale in the usual turnover time for the business).
70. Scheuber v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1967).
71. Koch v. United States, 457 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1972); Camp v: Murray, 226 F.2d
931 (4th Cir. 1955).
72. Simmons & O'Hare, supra note 35 at 220-21.
73. Hansche is discussed at text accompanying note 39, supra; Huxford and Kirby are
discussed in note 51, supra.
74. 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969).
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was primarily engaged in selling the Betton Hills property and that
though he was a civil engineer by profession, he did little work of
this type during the period in question save that done on the Betton
Hills property."75 The guiding principle for preparing an argument
comes from Corn Products, supra, in that, the business as defined
must not have the sale of the particular property integral to its
normal operations.
Bits of evidence which the courts have mentioned in their classi-
fication of the taxpayer's occupation or business included adver-
tisements in telephone books,76 statements on motel registration
cards and tax returns,77 and liability for self-employment tax.7"
1. The Use of Independent Contractors
A casual investor's eligibility for capital gain treatment will
turn on the extent of his development, promotional and sales activ-
ities. If the taxpayer engages in such through an agent or servant,
the activities will be imputed to him. If the activities are placed
exclusively in the hands of a broker or developer who acts on his
own behalf, then the concept of an independent contractor might
insulate the taxpayer. However, blending agency concepts with tax
law could further confuse the real estate situations under consider-
ation, and could be risky since any complicated arrangement will
be subject to close scrutiny by both the IRS and the courts.
The Restatement of Agency uses the word "servant" to'classify
persons for whose physical conduct the master is responsible." The
opposite of a servant is an "independent contractor" whose physi-
cal conduct in the performance of an undertaking is neither con-
trolled, nor subject to the master's right to control. 0 The tax-
payer's right to interfere with details appears to be the theory
which negates independent contractor status and causes activities
to be imputed.
An enlightening recent case is Voss v. United States,'8 in which
the court refused to attribute extensive development, promotional
75. 1I. at 906-07.
76. Huxford v. United States, 441 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1971).
77. United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969).
78. Id.
79. RFSTATFNI tNT (SFCOND) OF AGENCY § 2, Comment b (1957).
80. 1i. at § 2(3): see also, supra note 61.
81. 329 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964). The court refined the principle.of agency law by its
statement of the rule that "a taxpayer may not insulate himself from the acts of those whose
elforts are combined with his in an endeavor to make a profit." Id. at 166.
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and sales activities to a landowner who was thereby permitted
capital gain treatment. The taxpayer, a dentist, owned a farm
which could not profitably be sold as an entire tract. A realtor was
engaged to sell the property pursuant to a broad oral delegation
of power. The realtor did all the planning, had the land graded,
rezoned, annexed and qualified for F.H.A. loans; he installed
streets, sewage facilities and water mains; he also paid all subdivid-
ing and advertising costs. All expenditures were paid out of gross
sales proceeds so that the project was self-financing. The realtor
received a 10% commission on all sales. The only activities of the
taxpayer in connection with the entire transaction seemed to have
been the routine signing of deeds, while he continued his dentistry
practice, and the cashing of net proceeds checks sent to him period-
ically by the realtor.
In Hansche v. Commissioner2 the taxpayer relied on Voss un-
successfully. The realtors had placed signs on lots, advertised peri-
odically in the local newspaper, found interested prospects,
checked with the taxpayer for approval of building plans, and
handled" all lot sales. The promotion and advertising activities ap-
parently were not imputed since the court relied on a stipulation
that such activities were handled exclusively by the realtors, and
on the statement that "the lay seller of real estate very seldom
engages in commercial promotion or advertising of property which
he has placed in the hands of a broker for sale."83 However, the
development activities of the taxpayer were so extensive that the
case was lost on that ground alone. In the next area of activity,
effecting the sale, the court provided more helpful comments.
The record does not indicate the terms of the oral agreements
with the real estate brokers such as how sales prices were to be
determined and there is no record indication that there was au-
thority on the agent's part to fix the price of lots or the terms of
sale.84
The analysis continued and compared cases where activity was
imputed. In those cases,
the owner had set or controlled the price of the lots and was in
close contact with the developer of the property. . . .the record
in the case before us is silent as to who set the price of the lots
82. 457 F.2d 429, 433-34 (7th Cir. 1972).
83. IL at 434.
84. d at 431.
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...the burden of proof in this connection was on the taxpayer.5
The conclusion was that the sales "activities of the broker were
legally the activities of the taxpayer." 6
Another example of a case where activities were imputed is
Robert W. Pointer7 in which the taxpayer sold land to builders
who developed, advertised and resold the completed subdivision.
Th'e element of control came from the taxpayer's retention of title,
in the nature of a conditional sales agreement, as security for the
purchase price until a lot and house were sold as a package to a
third party. The taxpayer also financed construction and actively
controlled the quality of houses built through his approval of build-
ing plans.m
A casual investor who does not want to jeopardize his eligibility
for capital gain treatment does not have much choice, especially
where the property cannot be profitably sold without development
and subdivision. Someone will have to engage in the activities. If
a corporation is not used, it appears that the investor's only alter-
native is the method used in Voss, i.e., he would have to wash his
hands of all interest in the property from the time the independent
contractor is engaged until the property is sold.
2. Collection of Evidence of Deviation from
Ordinary Course of Business
The principal task of the real estate specialist is to sustain the
burden of proving that the sale of the property was an isolated
event, incidental and not integral to the normally conducted busi-
ness activity. The intentions at the time of purchase and the cir-
cumstances which prompted their reversal become relevant. The
best type of e.vidence is "changed intention," motivated by unanti-
cipated and undesirable events beyond the control of the taxpayer,
which caused the liquidation of the investment properties. The
burden can be satisfied by proving situations akin to the doctrine
of commercial frustration.89
85. Id. at 434.
86. Id.
87. 48 T.C. 906 (1967). afl'd 419 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1969).
88. The development and sales activities of builders and realtors in James H. Merritt,
Sr., 47 T.C. 519 (1967), were imputed as not sufficiently independent of the taxpayer, again,
because of retention of legal title to the lots and houses.
89. E.g.. Maddux Constr. Co., 54 T.C. 1278 (1970) (the normal business operations did
not provide the type of customers which would buy the particular parcel); Commissioner v.
Tri-State Corp.. 400 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1968), affg 48 T.C. 316 (1967) (threats of or actual
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V. CONCLUSION
The current state of the law, as formulated and discussed
above, indicates the apparent shift in the elements of section
122 1(1) relied upon in determining when property will be defined
as a capital asset. The change affects the planning techniques and
evidentiary burdens of all clients engaged in the buying and selling
of real estate-both dealers and non-dealers under the former clas-
sification. This article's breakdown of the cases should provide a
starting point for a more precise and consistent analysis. Although
most of the litigated situations involved sales of residential land,
the'same type of reasoning could be applied to any asset not cov-
ered by other sections of the Code. In any event, awareness must
be had of the complexities inherent in the phrase "property held
by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business."
MARTIN J. GREGORCICH
condemnation): Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967) (weak rental
market): Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1967) and 341
F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965) (the taxpayer entered into the sale with some reluctance or without
express satisfaction): Scheuber v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1967) (profit sub-
stantially more than can reasonably be expected in day-to-day business operations); Malat
v. Riddell. 383 U.S. 569 (1966) (disputes among business associates); Louis Lesser, 42 T.C.
688 (1964) (the reason for the sale might be a change in zoning); Sylvester A. Low-
ery. 1 64.030 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1964) (bad health or retirement); Charles T.
Grace. 61,252 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1961) (unexpected requirements for improvements);
D. G. Bradley, 26 T.C. 970 (1956), acquiesced in, 1957-1 CuMt. BULL. 3 (competition in
apartment rentals forced an upgrading of investments).
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